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Daniel Herz-Roiphe*
ABSTRACT:
Federal agencies count all fatalities prevented by regulation as having the
same value for the purposes of cost-benefit analysis, making no adjustment for
the age of the person saved. This uniform valuation is guided by empirical
studies that find that the young are not willing to pay more than the elderly for
small risk reductions in private markets. This Note argues for a different
approach. It proposes that agencies take account of a previously ignored body of
"public choice" research that finds that most individuals think government should
adopt lifesaving programs that benefit the young over those that benefit the old.
These data illustrate a divergence between people's private and public
preferences. While the economic theory that guides current agency practice
prioritizes the former over the latter, this Note argues that it should be the other
way around. The Note maintains that public choice data reflect a wider range of
societal commitments than individual willingness-to-pay metrics, and therefore
that the use of public choice data could help agencies satisfy their mandate under
Executive Order 13,563 to engage in broader forms of analysis. The Note also
posits that public choice data actually provide a better guide to the welfare
consequences of prioritizing lifesaving regulations for different age groups than
do individual willingness-to-pay data. It accordingly recommends a new system
of age adjustment based on public choice results.
Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2015. Many thanks to David Grewal, Reva Siegel, and Amy
Kapczynski for inspiring this piece, to Richard Zeckhauser and Lev Menand for being there at the
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INTRODUCTION
Seventy-three-page technical addenda to Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) regulatory analyses do not usually attract much attention. But, as EPA
Administrator Christine Todd Whitman would discover in the spring of 2003,
every rule has its exceptions.
The trouble started in early April, when no fewer than seventeen senior
citizens took to the microphone at an EPA-sponsored "Listening Session" to
excoriate Whitman over the Agency's recently released Methodologies for the
Benefit Analysis of the Clear Skies Initiative.' As the angry seniors' comments
revealed, this dry quantitative assessment, which reviewed the consequences of
reducing emissions from electric power-generating sources, had done something
quite controversial.2
The problem arose from the EPA's method of putting a price on human life
in order to monetize the health and safety gains associated with cleaner air. The
mere fact that the agency had engaged in this kind of arcane arithmetic was
unremarkable, as dozens of agency cost-benefit analyses do the same every year.
However, the way in which the Clear Skies analysis had carried out its life
pricing was unusual, and struck many of the Listening Session's guests (or
perhaps more importantly, the representatives from the Public Interest Research
Group (PIRG) who coordinated the seniors' demonstration 3) as morally obscene.
Calculating the value of a statistical life (VSL) requires deciding whether all
lives count for the same amount. In particular, should the young, who have long
lives ahead of them, receive the same weight as the elderly, who are likely to die
much sooner? The Clear Skies analysis caused trouble because of the approach it
took to this dilemma. In its primary benefit calculation, the analysis used a
constant VSL of $6 million to monetize each of the fatalities prevented by the
Clear Skies Initiative.4 In a sensitivity analysis, however, the report lowered the
VSL for individuals over sixty-five by 37%.
It was this "senior discount" that galvanized the well-organized army of
seniors to challenge the EPA's analytical techniques at the Listening Session,6
1. For a transcript of the proceedings, see Comments from the Tampa, FL Listening Session,
EPA, http://www.epa.gov/aging/listening/2003/tampa.htm (last visited May 23, 2012).
2. Technical Addendum: Methodologies for the Benefit Analysis of the Clear Skies Initiative,
EPA 4 (Sep. 2002), http://www.epa.gov/clearskies/tech-adden.pdf [hereinafter EPA
Methodologies].
3. See Cindy Skrzycki, Under Fire, EPA Drops the "Senior Death Discount," WASH. POST,
May 13, 2003, at E.01.
4. EPA Methodologies, supra note 2, at 33 (citing this VSL estimate in 1999 dollars).
5. Id. at 35.
6. The policy's opponents included AARP Director of Federal Affairs David Certner, who
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and the resulting political firestorm would burn throughout the spring. At event
after event, Whitman was greeted by crowds of angry protesters who wielded
signs proclaiming "seniors on sale" and distributed pamphlets denouncing the
EPA's decision to make seniors "worth 3/5 of a person."7 (In a cruel twist of fate,
the adjustment used in the EPA's analysis turned out to be virtually identical to
the infamous discount of slaves that appeared in the Three-Fifths Clause of the
original U.S. Constitution.) By May, Whitman had seen enough. At a Listening
Session event in Baltimore, she preempted the litany of angry comments by
declaring: "The senior discount factor has been stopped . . . . It has been
discontinued [by the OMB (Office of Management and Budget)]. E.P.A. will not,
I repeat, not, use an age-adjusted analysis in decision making."8 The House of
Representatives quickly followed suit, barring funding for any analyses that
employed such a technique9 -a powerful testament to the fact that "tangling
with the AARP can be more dangerous to a politician than blocking the entrance
to the Boca Raton Sizzler when it opens for the early bird special."'o
This fracas sounded the death knell for senior discounting in cost-benefit
analysis (CBA). In its wake, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA) Administrator John D. Graham circulated a memo advising all agencies
to discontinue their use of VSL age adjustments." Subsequently, OMB's
Circular A-4, which provides official executive branch guidance on conducting
CBA, warned agencies that they "should not use an age-adjustment factor in an
analysis using VSL estimates."1 2
Public outrage is not the only reason why senior discounting has fallen out
of favor, though. The regulatory establishment may have retreated from the
practice in response to popular pressure, but it defends its current use of uniform
mortality risk valuations by pointing to empirical data. Agencies calculate the
dollar value of a prevented fatality under the assumption that "the value of a
reduction in mortality risk . . . is what a person is willing to pay for it."' 3 The
7. Skrzycki, supra note 3, at E2.
8. See Katherine Q. Seelye & John Tierney, E.P.A. Drops Age-Based Cost Studies, N.Y.
TIMES, May 8, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/08/us/epa-drops-age-based-cost-
studies.html.
9. H.R. 2673, 108th Cong. div. G, tit. IV, § 419 (2004).
10. Robert Hahn & Scott Wallsten, Whose Life Is Worth More? (And Why Is It Horrible to
Ask?), WASH. POST, June 1, 2003, at B3.
11. Memorandum from John D. Graham, Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, to the President's Management Council (May 30, 2003). http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites
/default/files/omb/assets/regulatory-matters pdf/pmc benefit cost memo.pdf.
12. Circular A-4: Regulatory Analysis, U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET 30 (Sept. 17, 2003)
[hereinafter Circular A-4], http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/circulars
/a004/a-4.pdf.
13. Sci. Advisory Bd., Advisory on EPA's Issues in Valuing Mortality Risk Reduction, EPA, at
D- 10 (Oct. 12, 2007), http://nepis.epa.gov/Adobe/PDF/PI0007U3.pdf.
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VSL is accordingly determined by looking at empirical studies of how much
individuals are willing to pay to reduce small risks to their lives.14 Any age
adjustment responds to what these empirical studies show.
In 2003 this approach pointed towards senior discounting, because some
research at the time suggested that the elderly might be less willing to pay for
safety than their younger counterparts. " Since then, however, new evidence has
emerged challenging the idea that age decreases individuals' willingness to pay
(WTP) to reduce mortality risks. 16 As a result, at present, adjusting the VSL for
age is not only politically problematic but also, according to the postulates of
welfare economics, inaccurate." The logic underlying traditional CBA is the
logic of the market-it seeks to give everyone the amount of safety she is willing
to pay for. Therefore, unless dramatic new evidence on the relationship between
age and WTP for risk reductions were to emerge, orthodox economically oriented
policymakers would see little reason to account for age in regulatory analyses.' 8
Yet there is something missing from this picture, something that seems lost
on the senior discount's angry opponents, its beleaguered creators, and, most of
all, the technocrats who believe this is all a question of choosing the right
econometric model: As a society, how do we feel that government should
allocate lifesaving resources between the old and the young? In the midst of the
senior discounting tumult of 2003, few stopped to consider a fairly intuitive point
that the economist Alan Krupnick made to the New York Times: "If you ask
people on the street whether they prefer a policy that saves the life of a young
person or an elderly person, I think most people, including the elderly, would
save the young person."' 9 As it turns out, Krupnick's conjecture is supported by
more than just intuition. A large literature explores precisely this question by
eliciting individuals' preferences over government lifesaving programs that
benefit different age groups. Unsurprisingly, these studies identify an
14. See Lisa A. Robinson, How US Government Agencies Value Mortality Risk Reductions, I
REV. ENVTL. ECON. & Pot'Y 283 (2007), for a comprehensive overview of government practice.
15. EPA Methodologies, supra note 2, at 35 (citing MICHAEL JONES-LEE, THE ECONOMICS OF
SAFETY AND PHYSICAL RISK (1989)).
16. See Joseph Aldy & W. Kip Viscusi, Age Differences in the Value of Statistical Life:
Revealed Preference Evidence, I REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL'Y 241 (2007); Alan Krupnick,
Mortality Risk Valuation and Age: Stated Preference Evidence, I REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL'Y 261
(2007).
17. See NAT'L ACAD. OF SC., ESTIMATING MORTALITY RISK REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC
BENEFITS FROM CONTROLLING OZONE AIR POLLUTION 157 (2008) ("Empirical evidence of how
WTP varies with population and risk characteristics is not sufficiently consistent to support a
change in th[e] practice [of using constant VSL].").
18. Id.
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overwhelming desire to prioritize the young over the old.20
In spite of their apparent relevance to public policy, however, these studies
play no role in any cost-benefit analysis whatsoever. Because of its grounding in
neoclassical welfare economics, current regulatory practice relies solely on
evidence of how much individuals are willing to pay for small reductions in their
risk of dying. It is oblivious to research on how society wants to see its regulatory
priorities ordered.
This Note challenges agencies' methodological narrow-mindedness. It
argues that that the traditional economic approach to age adjustment struggles to
deliver on its self-proclaimed goal of maximizing social welfare, and decisively
fails when the focus shifts to the broader type of analysis mandated by Executive
Order 13,563, which calls on agencies to incorporate a wide range of societal
- * *21
concerns into their decision making.
The possibility of using public choice studies to guide age-adjustment in
cost-benefit analysis offers a more attractive vision of what regulatory analysis
could look like. Specifically, public choice studies offer two advantages over the
individual WTP evidence that undergirds the current regime. First, they provide a
better guide to the welfare consequences of allocating risk reductions to
individuals of different ages. This is because the conditions under which they
elicit data are more likely to induce reflective contemplation and less likely to be
corrupted by the influence of age-related changes in the marginal utility of
money than individual WTP metrics are. Second, public choice studies respond
to a broad range of citizens' beliefs on how to allocate lifesaving resources rather
than only considering individual welfare, which allows them to provide a richer
picture of sentiments on age adjustment. Therefore, incorporating public choice
studies into cost-benefit analysis would help make the practice a better proxy for
overall welfare and a more accurate reflection of society's full set of ethical
convictions (including "extra-welfarist" values that go beyond individual
wellbeing, such as fairness).
Part I provides an overview of the different methodologies employed by
individual WTP and collective choice studies, respectively, and the divergent
conclusions the two reach. It notes that current regulatory practice relies on the
former but not the latter. Part II interrogates this choice on economists' own
terms by asking which system of age adjustment provides the best proxy for
overall welfare. It offers both traditional and behavioral economic arguments for
why public choice data is actually better suited for this task than individual WTP
metrics. Part III moves beyond welfarist analysis. It finds that individual WTP
studies are fundamentally incapable of reflecting the broad range of extra-
20. See infra Part 1.
21. See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011).
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welfarist concerns implicated by the question of how to prioritize risk reductions
for individuals of different ages, but that public choice studies do a good job of
capturing many of these considerations. It also attempts to reconcile public
choice findings with the strong opposition to senior discounting expressed in
2003. Part IV discusses how to incorporate public choice data into regulatory
practice in light of its apparent advantages. Part V concludes.
I. Two WAYS OF ASKING A QUESTION
Individual WTP and public choice studies offer two fundamentally different
approaches to the question of how to allocate lifesaving resources between
different age groups. They also offer two fundamentally different answers. While
the former approach looks at respondents' tradeoffs between risk and personal
consumption and fails to find evidence for senior discounting, the latter
investigates individuals' beliefs about how governments should prioritize
different lifesaving projects, and reveals a strong preference for protecting the
young over the old.
A. Individual WTP Studies
Individual WTP research proceeds in two primary ways: through revealed
preference studies, which look at the wage premiums offered for risky jobs, and
through stated preference studies, which survey respondents about their
willingness to pay for hypothetical risk reductions. 22 Both of these techniques are
market-based mechanisms-they seek to discover how much safety consumers
would be willing to purchase in well-functioning markets.2 3 As a result, a public
policy that responds to this type of research allocates safety between young and
old with reference to the market. It holds that the young should have more safety
than the old if, and only if, they are willing to pay more for it. 24
As it turns out, the young are not willing to dole out more to protect
themselves from harm. Revealed preference studies suggest that WTP for
mortality risk reductions follows an inverted-U trajectory over the course of a
lifespan, peaking in late middle age.25 Furthermore, the curve's rise is steeper
than its decline, meaning that the average sixty-year-old is willing to pay
22. See Robinson, supra note 14, at 283-84. The EPA, for example, relies on 26 empirical
studies for its VSL estimate, of which 21 are labor market revealed preference studies and 5 are
contingent valuation surveys. See Nat'l Ctr. for Envtl. Econ. Office of Policy, Guidelines for
Preparing Economic Analyses, EPA, at B-1-B-2 (Dec. 17, 2010) [hereinafter EPA Guidelines],
http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/vwAN/EE-0568-50.pdfl$file/EE-0568-50.pdf.
23. See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 191 (1993).
24. See, e.g., Sci. Advisory Bd., supra note 13, at 10.
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considerably more to reduce mortality risks than the average twenty-year-old.26
Stated preference studies, meanwhile, have trouble finding any consistent
relationship between age and WTP. A 2007 meta-analysis concluded that the data
paints "a mixed and somewhat confusing picture."2 7 Neither set of studies,
therefore, supports the conclusion that VSL decreases with age.28
The absence of an age-related decline in VSL is not a surprise for economic
theorists. For decades, many economists have predicted that older individuals
might pay more for mortality risk reductions than their younger counterparts,
largely because they have more financial resources available and fewer
alternatives on which to spend them.29 With safety, as with any other good,
willingness to pay is a function of both the utility gained through consumption
and the utility lost through foregone alternatives. Insofar as the old face relatively
low opportunity costs for purchasing risk reductions because of their financial
circumstances, they will spend more to protect their lives.
As a result, a market-based answer says that we should not employ a higher
VSL for the young since they are not willing to pay more for risk reductions. It
dismisses any other inputs as little more than cheap talk.
B. Public Choice Studies
Public choice research approaches the question quite differently. Instead of
asking respondents to choose between their own money and their own safety, it
asks them how society should allocate risk reductions between different groups-
for example, whether a limited supply of flu vaccines should go to the young or
the elderly first.30 These studies make no attempt to offer a roadmap for
replicating market outcomes. They treat their respondents as citizens who must
decide what their government should do, rather than as consumers who need only
choose which private goods to purchase.
The literature finds that most individuals express a strong desire to allocate
lifesaving resources to the young over the old. In one representative study,
Maureen Cropper, Sema Aydede, and Paul Portney asked subjects to choose
between lifesaving government medical programs that affected different age
26. Id.
27. Krupnick, supra note 16, at 274.
28. The meta-analyses reflect the fact that more recent research, for example, Anna Alberini et
al., Does the Value of a Statistical Life Vary with Age & Health Status? Evidence from the US and
Canada, 48 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 769 (2004), has largely failed to replicate the few early
efforts, for example, EPA Methodologies, supra note 2, at 35 (citing JONES-LEE, supra note 15),
that found a negative relationship between age and WTP.
29. See, e.g., Donald S. Shepard & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Survival Versus Consumption, 30
MGMT. Sci. 423 (1984).
30. See Meng Li et al., How Do People Value Life?, 21 PSYCHOL. Sc. 163, 164 (2010).
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groups. Their results suggested that respondents were indifferent between saving
one twenty-year-old and seven sixty-year-olds. 31 Similarly, another team of
researchers recently found that subjects were willing to trade the lives of ten
sixty-year-olds for just one ten-year-old.32 Not all studies uncover such dramatic
results, but the direction of preference is quite consistent 3 3: across many different
surveys, individuals put a premium on saving the young over the elderly.34
It is tempting to assume that these results are driven by the self-serving
chauvinism of youthful respondents, but this is not the case. The preference for
prioritizing younger lives is evident across age groups-both young and old alike
seem to embrace the notion that society should focus its lifesaving efforts on
younger citizens. 35 Indeed, when researchers ask respondents to explain their
choices, the experimental subjects embrace a number of compelling justifications
for favoring younger individuals-notably, that the young deserve priority
because they have longer future lifespans, have not yet had as many opportunities
for living, and still have their most productive years ahead of them.36
Therefore, our preferences as citizens seem to diverge significantly from our
preferences as consumers. While individuals are not willing to pay more to save
their own lives when they are young, the principle that society should pay more
to save young lives still enjoys widespread acceptance in public choice contexts.
C. The Current Approach
Economic theory's strident individualism and unwavering respect for
consumer sovereignty leaves little room for the public choice approach. The
traditional neoclassical view is encapsulated by W. Kip Viscusi, one of the
pioneers of using VSL analysis in public policy, who writes that "[w]hat matters
from the standpoint of benefit valuation is whether the personal willingness to
pay has declined, irrespective of whether a third party government policymaker
31. Maureen L. Cropper et al., Preferences for Life Saving Programs: How the Public
Discounts Time and Age, 8 J. RIsK& UNCERTAINTY 243,243 (1994).
32. Daniel Eisenberg et al., Valuing Health at Diferent Ages: Evidence from a Nationally
Representative Survey in the US, 9 APPLIED HEALTH ECON. & HEALTH POL'Y 149, 150-53 (2011).
33. See Paul Dolan et al., QAL Y Maximization and People's Preferences: A Methodological
Review of the Literature, 14 HEALTH EcoN. 197, 202 (2005) ("[M]ost studies suggest that health
gains to the old are weighted less.").
34. See, e.g., Fredrik Carlsson et al., Preferences for Lives, Injuries, and Age: A Stated
Preference Study, 42 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 1814, 1817-19 (2010); Olof Johansson-
Stenman & Peter Martinsson, Are Some Lives More Valuable? An Ethical Preferences Approach,
27 J. HEALTH ECON. 739, 744-46 (2008); Li et al., supra note 30, at 166-67; Aki Tsuchiya et al.,
Measuring People's Preferences Regarding Ageism in Health, 57 SoC. SC. & MED. 687, 692
(2003).
35. See Eisenberg et al., supra note 32, at 153; Li et al., supra note 30, at 165-67; Johansson-
Stenman & Martinsson, supra note 32, at 746.
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thinks that people should be willing to pay less for risk reduction if fewer years
of life are being saved." 37
The regulatory state has resoundingly agreed. Current agency practice
assumes that "the value of a reduction in mortality risk . . . is what a person is
willing to pay for it." 38 Accordingly, OMB recommends that age adjustment
respond to "the effect of age on VSL [i.e., individual WTP] estimates. "39 This
approach elevates individual WTP data and leaves no room for a public choice
approach. It ensures that regulatory analysis will respond to our preferences as
consumers of risk in private markets, but ignore our preferences over what
society should do. In the Parts that follow, I ask whether such an emphasis is
justified.
II. WELFARE
In this Part, I challenge the consensus that basing VSL age adjustments on
individual WTP best accomplishes the economist's traditional goal of
maximizing social welfare. Public choice studies are less likely than WTP-based
research to be corrupted by age-based differences in the marginal utility of
money and by cognitive biases that make it difficult for individuals to value
mortality risks. As a result, they are better designed to allow cost-benefit analysis
to serve as a decision-making tool that points us towards welfare-enhancing
policies.
A. What Is the Point of Cost-Benefit Analysis?
Determining how to account for age in cost-benefit analysis (CBA) requires
answering the more fundamental question of what cost-benefit analysis is trying
to accomplish in the first place.
CBA can trace its intellectual ancestry back to Jeremy Bentham, who
believed in evaluating policy proposals by summing up the various pains and
pleasures they generated.4 0 In spite of its classical utilitarian pedigree, however,
modem CBA harbors no pretensions of realizing Bentham's grand goal of true
hedonic calculus. By the early twentieth century, economists had already given
up on the Benthamite exercise of comparing cardinal utilities across different
41persons. In its place, they embraced the Pareto criterion, which sidesteps the
37. W. Kip Viscusi, The Devaluation of Life, 3 REG. & GOVERNANCE 103,112 (2009).
38. Sci. Advisory Bd., supra note 13, at D-10.
39. Circular A-4, supra note 12, at 30.
40. See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 32 (Hafner Press 1973).
41. See generally LIONEL ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
ECONOMIC SCIENCE (1952) (rejecting the possibility of interpersonal utility comparisons).
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problem of interpersonal utility comparisons by only conceding that a state of
affairs A is better than an alternative B if at least one person is better off, and
none is worse off, in A than in B.42
The Pareto criterion, though fairly uncontroversial, is also excessively
restrictive. Almost no government policy proposals could meet its stringent
requirements.43 For the purposes of actual policy analysis, therefore, welfare
economists turned to the Pareto criterion's funhouse mirror reflection, the
Kaldor-Hicks test. A proposal passes Kaldor-Hicks if those who benefit from it
could compensate those who are harmed and still have something left over-in
other words, if the outcome created by the proposal could be transformed into a
Pareto superior result through a costless transfer from its beneficiaries to its
opponents (making it a "potential" Pareto improvement).4
Modern cost-benefit analysis is traditionally conceived as a way of
determining whether a hypothetical policy satisfies the Kaldor-Hicks
requirement. Cost-benefit analysis assesses the desirability of a proposal A
against the status quo B by tallying each affected individual's "compensating
variation" for A-the amount of money that, if received in B, would make her
indifferent between A and B. If the resulting sum is positive, then the proposed
policy "passes" cost-benefit analysis, and must, by definition, satisfy the Kaldor-
Hicks test as well.45
Yet Kaldor-Hicks is a dubious standard. Since the theoretical compensations
it envisions never actually take place, it is difficult to say with confidence that
all-or even most-Kaldor-Hicks improvements actually make the world better
in any meaningful way.4 6 Indeed, it is easy to imagine many circumstances in
which they do not. The economist Uwe Reinhardt, for example, once noted that a
world in which you agree to let me punch you in the face in return for twenty
dollars, and then I break your nose and run off without paying is, according to the
Kaldor-Hicks test, superior to a world without the assault and broken promise.47
The potentially significant disconnect between Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and
welfare (to say nothing of justice) makes it unclear whether we should embrace
cost-benefit analysis merely because it approves policies that are Kaldor-Hicks
42. See DANIEL M. HAUSMAN & MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, MORAL
PHILOSOPHY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 136-40 (2d ed. 2006).
43. See Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J.
1221-22 (1991).
44. For an overview of Kaldor-Hicks, see RICHARD E. JUST ET AL., THE WELFARE ECONOMICS
OF PUBLIC POLICY: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO PROJECT AND POLICY EVALUATION 32-48 (2004).
45. See LEE S. FRIEDMAN, THE MICROECONOMICS OF PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS 169 (2002)
(grounding CBA in the idea of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency).
46. See Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191,196-201 (1980).
47. Uwe E. Reinhardt, Reflections on the Meaning of Efficiency: Can Efficiency Be Separated
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efficient.
Matthew Adler and Eric Posner offer a far more compelling alternative.
According to their account, CBA should be understood as a welfarist decision-
making procedure that carries no moral weight in and of itself, but is justifiable
because it can, if practiced correctly, help direct us towards welfare-enhancing
policies while providing salutary constraints on the discretion of fallible agency
policymakers.48 Moving from a standard wealth-maximizing justification for
CBA to Adler and Posner's "weak welfarist" account puts the practice on firmer
footing by eliminating the need to rely on Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as a legitimate
standard of value.49
It also changes our understanding of age adjustment. Under the Kaldor-
Hicks approach, the point of CBA is to approve policies that are potential Pareto
improvements. If we accept that premise, then we should adjust the VSL for age
if, and only if, the young are willing to pay more for risk reductions than the old,
because only a person who is willing to pay a lot for safety will have a high
compensating variation for a policy that delivers more safety to him. Within this
framework, therefore, measures of how individual WTP for safety vary with age
are the only relevant data for policymakers.
Under Adler and Posner's conception of CBA, however, (or Bentham's, for
that matter), the point of cost-benefit analysis is not to identify potential Pareto
improvements, but rather to serve as a proxy for social welfare.o In that case, we
should adjust the VSL for age if, and only if, mortality risk reductions bring more
welfare to younger individuals. This makes it far from obvious what type of
evidence should govern CBA practice. The answer presumably rests on whether
individual WTP or public choice metrics provide a better proxy for the
differential welfare benefits of mortality risk reductions for the young and old.5 '
B. Do Individual WTP or Public Choice Studies Better Approximate Welfare?
Two considerations weigh in favor of public choice studies over individual
WTP research. Individual WTP studies are likely to be insensitive to what we do
care about-whether mortality risk reductions bring greater benefits to the young
48. See MATTHEw D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS 62-100 (2006).
49. Id. at 63-69.
50. A premise of this approach is that a person's willingness to pay for a good and the welfare
she receives from it will not always mirror each other.
51. Definitively answering this question would, of course, require an account of how to
conduct interpersonal utility comparisons. While this problem deserves a more thorough treatment
than this Note can give it, one possible solution comes from John Harsanyi's proposal to consider
the preferences of impartial spectators over life-history lotteries. For an overview, see ADLER &
POSNER, supra note 48, at 43-52.
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or the old-and corrupted by a factor we should not care about-the differential
marginal utility of money for different age groups. Public choice studies, by
contrast, are completely uninfluenced by the interaction between age and the
marginal utility of money, and significantly more likely to reflect relevant
variations in the welfare effects of risk reductions for different age groups.
1. The Marginal Utility of Money
There is little doubt that studies of individual WTP for risk reductions are
more highly influenced by age-based differences in the marginal utility of money
than public choice studies are. Older individuals have, on average, significantly
more financial resources available than the young, which drives up the amount
they can spend on safety. 5 2 While WTP studies often control for income, they
still miss most of this age-based resource disparity by failing to control for
wealth. Furthermore, even at any given level of resources, the elderly likely
face low opportunity costs to spending on risk reductions, as their short
remaining lifespans offer few attractive investment prospects, decreasing the
returns to saving.54 Additionally, their high background mortality risks produce a
"dead anyway" effect: since they are likely to die in the near future, they have
powerful incentives to spend down their resources quickly.5 As a result, much of
what individual WTP studies tell us is how the marginal utility of money varies
with age, not how the benefits of a risk reduction vary with age.
While this information is highly relevant for individuals determining how
much to pay for safety in private markets, it should not direct public regulatory
policy. In private markets, consumers rightly vary their WTP for safety in
response to the value of safety to them and the value of money to them. A cash-
strapped individual might reasonably hesitate to purchase even a highly valuable
risk reduction if doing so would require him to forego essentials like food and
shelter. Policymakers, on the other hand, need not alter society's willingness to
pay for safety based on the protected population's marginal utility of money.
This is because in most cases, the beneficiaries of a government regulation do not
also pay its costs.56 The social opportunity cost of paying for a regulation usually
52. See Per-Olov Johansson, On the Definition and Age-Dependency of the Value of a
Statistical Life, 25 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 251 (2002).
53. James K. Hammitt, Valuing Changes in Mortality Risk: Lives Saved Versus Life Years
Saved, I REv. ENVTL. ECON. & Pot'Y 228, 237 (2007).
54. See Yew-Kwang Ng, The Older the More Valuable: Divergence Between Utility and
Dollar Values of Life as One Ages, 55 J. ECON. 1, 9-11 (1992).
55. See Ariel Porat & Avraham Tabbach, Willingness to Pay, Death, Wealth, and Damages,
13 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 45, 45-49 (2011); John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Willingness to
Pay and the Distribution ofRisk and Wealth, 104 J. POL. ECoN. 747, 762 (1996).
56. For an extensive treatment of this argument, see Cass R. Sunstein, Valuing Life: A Plea for
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bears no relation to the financial circumstances of those it protects.
Choosing to base our approach to age adjustment on individual WTP is
tantamount to pegging the level of safety that the government should provide to
the financial situation of the individuals receiving it 58-something that we
(rightly) refuse to do in most other contexts. 59 Therefore, if we hope to make
CBA approximate welfare as closely as possible, we should adjust the VSL only
in response to age-based differences in the value of mortality risk reductions, not
age-based differences in the marginal utility of money.6 0
Public choice studies fit the bill well in this respect because they are entirely
unaffected by age-based differences in the marginal utility of money. Unlike
individual WTP studies, they ask their subjects to choose between risks and other
risks, not between risks and money. A respondent's personal finances have little
direct effect on his preferences for, say, allocating flu vaccines between young
and old.6' Accordingly, we need not be concerned that public choice data are
primarily driven by opportunity cost effects.
2. Cognitive Biases
The real question, therefore, is whether public choice studies can accurately
reflect the differential benefits of risk reductions to different age groups, or at
least do so better than studies of individual WTP. One of the oldest traditions of
economics maintains that individuals are the best judges of their own welfare. 6 2
As John Stuart Mill famously argued, "with respect to his own feelings and
circumstances, the most ordinary man or woman has means of knowledge
57. The benefits of the Clean Air Act, for example, tend to accrue disproportionately to poor
and minority communities in spite of the fact that the costs are largely borne elsewhere. See
Matthew E. Kahn, The Beneficiaries of the Clean Air Act, 24 REGULATION 34, 35-38, (2001). This
fact-along, of course, with egalitarian ethical convictions-helps explain why agencies do not
bump up the VSL for the rich in spite of powerful evidence that the demand for safety displays
positive income elasticity. See W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a Statistical Life: A
Critical Review of Market Estimates Throughout the World, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 36-38
(2003).
58. Policymakers do not appear to be oblivious to this fact. Circular A-4 tells agencies to
"adopt a larger VSLY estimate for senior citizens because seniors face larger overall health risks
and they may have accumulated savings to spend on health and safety." Circular A-4, supra note
12, at 30.
59. For example, we refuse to adjust the VSL for race in spite of the fact that African-
Americans display lower willingness to pay for risk reductions than whites. See W. Kip Viscusi,
Racial Differences in Labor Market Values of a Statistical Life, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 236,
252 (2003).
60. See John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Willingness to Pay and the Distribution of
Risk and Wealth, 104 J. POL. EcON. 747, 762 (1996).
61. See, e.g., Eisenberg et al., supra note 32, at 152 (finding that income was "not significantly
associated with reported preferences" on allocating lifesaving resources to different age groups).
62. See LEONARD W. SUMNER, WELFARE, HAPPINESS, AND ETHICS 113-22 (1996).
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immeasurably surpassing those that can be possessed by anyone else."63 Why,
then, should we trust public choice studies, which measure how much third
parties value risk reductions to different age groups, over studies of individual
WTP, which measure what the members of those age groups think themselves?
The answer lies in the limits of human cognition. While neoclassical
economics posits that individuals are always the best judges of their own welfare,
modem psychology begs to differ. 64 In some situations, humans act in ways that
they would not endorse under conditions of full information and rationality.
Decisions regarding how much mortality risk protection to buy are precisely the
sorts of complex, affect-laden choices that are most likely to diverge from the
stable, well-considered preferences of the agents that make them.65 As a result,
there may be good psychological reasons to believe that individual WTP data are
not particularly reliable, and that the public choice elicitation framework offers a
more effective means of gauging individuals' reasoned understandings of how
age affects the value of safety.
First among these reasons is that it is extremely difficult for a person to
appreciate what the length of his expected future lifespan actually means. We
intuitively believe that risk reductions are more valuable to twenty-year-olds than
to eighty-year-olds because twenty-year-olds can be expected to live much
longer.66 After all, lives are never truly "saved;" they are merely extended, and it
seems highly relevant whether that extension is for six years or for sixty. 67A
empirical study can accordingly give us meaningful information about the
relative value of risk reductions to different age groups only if its subjects are at
last somewhat attuned to the length of their future lifespans. If individuals are
oblivious to this important consideration, then their choices carry little normative
weight.
Unfortunately, human beings are notoriously bad at understanding how a
good's magnitude affects it value. One well-known study found that different
groups of subjects demonstrated identical WTP to save 2,000, 20,000, or 200,000
63. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 124 (Edward Alexander ed., Broadview Press 1999)
(1859).
64. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Richard H. Thaler, Utility Maximization and Experienced
Utility, 20 J. ECON. PERSP. 221 (2006).
65. See John Beshears et al., How Are Preferences Revealed?, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1787 (2008);
Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Zeckhauser, Dreadful Possibilities, Neglected Probabilities, in THE
IRRATIONAL ECONOMIST: MAKING DECISIONS IN A DANGEROUS WORLD 116 (Erwin Michel-Kerjan &
Paul Slovic eds., 2010).
66. An American twenty-year-old can expect to live, on average, for 58.8 more years, while an
eighty-year-old's remaining life expectancy is only 9.1 years. See Elizabeth Arias, United States
Life Tables, 2004, 56 NAT'L VITAL STAT. REP., Dec. 28, 2007, at 1, 3.
67. See Michael J. Moore & W. Kip Viscusi, The Quantity-Adjusted Value of Life, 26 ECON.
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migratory birds, 68 while another discovered approximately equal WTP to clean
all the lakes in Ontario or to clean just a few.6 9 These findings of "magnitude
neglect" have been replicated across a wide variety of contexts, including,
tellingly, the size of mortality risk reductions70 and the length of periods of
time. 7'
Psychologists have generally found that individuals are significantly more
likely to exhibit magnitude neglect when they are emotionally aroused, when the
good in question is difficult to evaluate, and when they are forced to consider
goods in isolation as opposed to in comparison to different-sized alternatives. 7 2
All of these factors are present when a person considers how much she is willing
to pay for a reduction in the probability of dying. The decision is affectively rich,
involves evaluating highly unfamiliar and perplexing objects like "death" and
"living the rest of life," and is performed in isolation, offering little opportunity
for the purchaser to compare her future life to the future lives of others. As a
result, it seems likely that individuals contemplating whether to purchase
mortality risk reductions are insensitive to the size of their future lifespans.n
At least one study provides direct support for this idea. In a contingent
valuation survey, Jill Morris and James Hammitt found no significant difference
between current WTP for a risk reduction (in this case a hypothetical pneumonia
vaccine) received at age sixty and current WTP for an equivalent risk reduction
delayed until seventy.74 This initially perplexing finding makes perfect sense if
individuals do not readily appreciate the fact that risk reductions confer more
value when life expectancy is longer because they are oblivious to the significant
68. William H. Desvousges et al., Measuring Natural Resource Damages with Contingent
Valuation: Tests of Validity and Reliability, in CONTINGENT VALUATION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT
91, 94 (Jerry A. Hausman ed., 1993).
69. Daniel Kahneman & Jack L. Knetsch, Valuing Public Goods: The Purchase of Moral
Satisfaction, 22 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 57, 65 (1992).
70. See, e.g., Jonathan Baron & Joshua Greene, Determinants of Insensitivity to Quantity in
Valuation of Public Goods: Contribution, Warm Glow, Budget Constraints, Availability, and
Prominence, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 107 (1996). For a review of the literature, see
James K. Hammitt & John D. Graham, Willingness to Pay for Health Protection: Inadequate
Sensitivity to Probability?, 8 J. RIsK & UNCERTAINTY 33 (1999).
71. See, e.g., Carey K. Morowedge et al., Duration Sensitivity Depends on Stimulus
Familiarity, 138 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GENERAL 177 (2009); Carol Varey & Daniel
Kahneman, Experiences Extended Across Time: Evaluation of Moment and Episodes, 5 J. BEHAV.
DECISION MAKING 169 (1992).
72. See Christopher K. Hsee et al., When Is More Better? On the Relationship Between
Magnitude and Subjective Value, 14 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SC. 234, 235-36 (2005).
73. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years, and Willingness to Pay, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 205,
234 (2004) ("It is possible that in contingent valuation studies or in market behavior, the number of
years is 'telescoped' into a kind of single unit, called 'the rest of life."').
74. Jill Morris & James K. Hammitt, Using Life Expectancy to Communicate Benefits of
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impact that the length of a future life has on the amount of welfare it contains.
Public choice studies may help solve this problem. By asking respondents
about risk reductions for others rather than for themselves, these studies avoid
eliciting the affective arousal that comes with contemplating the prospect of
one's own death. In addition, public choice studies promote comparative
evaluation. Rather than ask respondents about the absolute value of saving
twenty-year-olds or sixty-year-olds, they ask for a relative prioritization of age
groups. Consequently, the public choice approach is far more likely to bring
about the kind of reflective cognitive evaluation that responds to differences in
magnitude. Indeed, the fact that younger individuals have more years left to live
is one of the primary explanations public choice study respondents offer for
prioritizing young lives.
Of course, the preferences expressed in public choice studies likely respond
to more than just welfare considerations.7 6 As a result, it is dubious to attribute
the strong preferences identified by these studies solely to public perceptions of
welfare benefits focusing on the safety of the young. But nonetheless, public
choice studies likely offer a directionally accurate guide to the welfare
consequences of age adjustment.
Individual WTP studies, by contrast, may not provide much useful
information about the differential welfare benefits of safety for different age
groups because persons contemplating risk reductions for themselves are likely to
be insensitive to the magnitude of their future lifespans. Furthermore, any useful
signals may be lost in the noise created by differences in the marginal utility of
77
money between age groups.
Therefore, if we want to employ the CBA procedure that is most likely to
recommend welfare-enhancing policies, we might more justifiably rely on the
age adjustments suggested by public choice studies than on the individual WTP
data that guide current agency practice.
III. MOVING BEYOND WELFARE
Cost-benefit analysis, as traditionally practiced, "is premised on the notion
that public policy should impartially and objectively reflect the determinants of
individual well-being, paying no heed whatsoever to goals or interests that are
articulated at the collective level."7 In keeping with this tradition, the previous
75. See Eisenberg et al., supra note 32, at 152; Tsuchiya et al., supra note 34, at 694.
76. See infra Part Ill.
77. See discussion supra Subsection IBI.B.L
78. DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE
SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY 15 (2010); accord FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS:
ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 37 (2004); see also
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Part defended the use of public choice data for age adjustment within a welfarist,
individualist framework. Yet many critics find such reductionism unappealing;
they argue that it renders regulation incapable of responding to a wide range of
publicly held values79 and saps health and safety protections of important
expressive meanings.so Their views have recently penetrated the regulatory state,
which appears to be moving towards a broader approach to policy analysis.
President Obama's Executive Order 13,563-"a kind of mini-constitution for the
regulatory state"8 -calls upon regulators to "take into account benefits and
costs, both quantitative and qualitative," including "fairness," "distributive
impacts," and "human dignity." 82
If, in line with Executive Order 13,563's dictates, we accept that regulatory
analysis is about more than just welfare maximization, then the case for basing
age adjustments on public choice studies instead of individual WTP metrics
grows even stronger. Public choice studies may very well be better than their
individual WTP counterparts at reflecting the differential welfare consequences
of allocating safety to the young and old. Yet there is no doubt that they are more
adept at incorporating extra-welfarist convictions-in particular, beliefs about
fairness-that have a significant bearing on how society wishes to see its
regulatory priorities ordered.
A. Incorporating Extra- Welfarist Concerns
The public choice elicitation method is, by its very nature, flexible.
Experimental subjects asked which policy programs they prefer can pick one
option or another for any reason-including reasons that do not concern what
they, as individuals, would do, but instead what we, as a political community,
should do. Individual WTP research, by contrast, offers its subjects a narrow
choice-whether to purchase, or not purchase, a particular product for
Normative Flaws ofCost-Benefit Analysis, 48 Hous. L. REV. 79, 90 (2011).
79. ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 210.
80. KYSAR, supra note 78, at 101.
81. Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Cost-Benefit Analysis: Thirty-Six Questions (and
Almost as Many Answers) (Harvard Public Law, Working Paper No. 13-11, 2013),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=2199112.
82. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011). Changing the way that
CBA is conducted has profound implications for regulation, because CBA is mandated for all
"economically significant" regulations by executive order. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R.
638 (1994); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982).
83. I will not attempt restate all the arguments made by critics of narrow cost-benefit
analysis-nor those of its defenders-here. I merely wish to explore the implications of a broader
conception of cost-benefit analysis for the question of age adjustment. For an array of persuasive
critiques of narrow CBA, see KYSAR, supra note 78, at 99-119. For a full-throated defense of
traditional CBA, see John D. Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 395 (2008).
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themselves. It is, by design, incapable of responding to "goals or interests that are
articulated at the collective level."84
This disparity is particularly evident with regard to questions of fairness. The
decision of how to allocate lifesaving resources between young and old is as
much about equity as it is about efficiency.85 Life-years saved do not accrue to
society collectively, but rather to particular individuals, and deciding which
individuals deserve what is a thorny ethical problem. Some have argued that
prioritizing the young over the old, even if welfare-enhancing, violates our
commitment to equal respect for persons.8 6 Others counter that failing to
prioritize the young is the true injustice, since it puts an unfair premium on the
life-years of the elderly.8 7 Still others contend that the principles of equality
actually require us to overweight the life-years of the young, since the young
have enjoyed fewer opportunities for living thus far, whereas the old have
already had their "fair innings" of life.
The key point is that individual WTP studies are fundamentally incapable of
reflecting any of these considerations because they only elicit individuals'
valuations of risk reductions for themselves, and offer no opportunity for
respondents to indicate how their claims for safety compare to those of others.89
Public choice studies, on the other hand, specifically ask respondents to make
interpersonal comparisons, and are therefore highly responsive to citizens' beliefs
about fairness. Indeed, convictions regarding what is fair appear to be the
primary drivers of subject behavior in public choice experiments. Aki Tsuchiya
and his colleagues, for example, found that the most common explanation for
their respondents' decisions to prioritize risk reductions for the young was a
belief that the young deserved more protection because they had not yet lived as
long. 90
Equity in lifespan allocation is not the only extra-welfarist concern driving
public choice study results. Some researchers have found that subjects prioritized
different age groups based on their belief that parents should receive greater
84. KYSAR, supra note 78, at 15.
85. For discussions of the ethical issues raised, see, for example, JOHN MCKIE ET AL., THE
ALLOCATION OF HEALTH CARE RESOURCES: AN ETHICAL EVALUATION OF THE QALY APPROACH 47-
73 (1998); and Klemens Kappel & Peter Sandoe, QAL Ys, Age and Fairness, 6 BIOETHICs 297, 311-
16(1992).
86. See, e.g., JOHN HARRIS, THE VALUE OF LIFE, 91-94 (1985).
87. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 73, at 216-21.
88. See, e.g., Alan Williams, Intergenerational Equity: An Exploration of the "Fair Innings"
Argument, 6 HEALTH ECON. 117, 119(1997).
89. Cf ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 211 ("Some of the concerns people have as citizens
cannot in principle be expressed in their roles as consumers, but must be expressed through their
political relations with other citizens.").
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protections because of their unique social role as family providers. 91 Others
found that subjects prefer to allocate safety to the young because the young still
have much to contribute to society. 92 The potential array of beliefs is virtually
unlimited; the important takeaway is that public choice evaluation can
incorporate them all.
The fact that the age adjustments suggested by public choice studies reflect a
broad range of extra-welfarist concerns that individual WTP studies ignore
altogether has important implications for the type of broad policy analysis
recommended by Executive Order 13,563. If regulators are to "take into account
benefits and costs, both quantitative and qualitative," including "fairness" and
"dignity," 9 3 then it is essential that they incorporate measures like public choice
data. Employing metrics that respond to all of the potential reasons citizens could
have for preferring one approach to another-including those that only arise at
the collective level-enables policymakers to take account of concerns like
equity and distributive justice. This type of inclusive review is impossible if
regulators restrict themselves to individual WTP metrics, which only reflect
narrow welfare considerations.
B. Do Public Choice Studies Accurately Reflect Societal Convictions?
Some might nonetheless question whether public choice studies accurately
mirror society's consensus on VSL age adjustment, or challenge whether views
expressed through a (admittedly very sophisticated) form of "opinion polling"
should be normative for public policy at all. Cass Sunstein, for example, one of
the foremost scholars of cost-benefit analysis, attacks both the reliability of
public choice data and the very idea of trying to determine our regulatory
priorities by asking citizens what they think. He asserts that responses to public
choice surveys "are highly likely to depend on how the questions are set up," and
that "even if people do have stable answers to such questions, it is unclear that
those answers have any moral standing for purposes of policy and law." 94
These criticisms deserve attention, but they seem overblown. Sunstein's
characterization of public choice results as irredeemably volatile is unfair. While
the magnitude of age-based preferences may vary across studies, their direction
and significance are remarkably consistent.95 And if public choice studies do
reflect stable preferences, then why should they not influence public policy?
91. See, e.g., Cropper et al., supra note 31, at 258.
92. See Eisenberg et al., supra note 32, at 152.
93. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011).
94. Sunstein, supra note 73, at 242.
95. For that matter, the differences in magnitude are small compared to the variance found in
traditional VSL studies. The lowest and highest of the 26 VSL values used by the EPA, for
example, vary by a factor of approximately 23. EPA Guidelines, supra note 22, at B-2 tbl.B-1.
369
20
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 14 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol14/iss2/3
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
Sunstein seems to worry that public choice studies will reflect objectively bad
preferences that trample upon minority rights. "Suppose, for example," he
speculates, "that a relevant population concluded that it would rather save one
hundred white lives than one hundred African American lives."96 In such a
circumstance a policymaker might, indeed, hesitate to act on the will of the
majority. Yet age adjustment is not such a circumstance. One of the most
remarkable features of public choice surveys is that they find that both young and
old alike embrace the idea of prioritizing lifesaving for the young.97 As a result, it
is hard to write off their results as mere bigotry.
More generally, Sunstein asserts that "a deliberative democracy . . . should
not make policy on the basis of opinion polls."98 Yet this argument seems to
ignore the fact that an individual WTP-based age adjustment regime also looks to
citizens' preferences-either as stated in surveys or as revealed in market
behavior-for definitive guidance on what government should do. In fact, in a
contest of which procedure more closely adhered to the ideals of "deliberative
democracy," asking individuals how society should allocate its lifesaving
resources would seem to have a clear advantage over asking individuals how
much they were willing to pay to reduce risks to their own lives.
A more powerful objection to using public choice data in CBA is that the
best expression of societal consensus on VSL age adjustment comes not from any
empirical study, but rather from the powerful opposition to senior discounting
expressed by protestors and activists in 2003. Sean Hannon Williams, for
example, writes that
This public debate . . . essentially transferred the decision about which [age
adjustment] model to follow from the agency to the political arena. In that
arena, the normative assumptions underlying the models took center stage.
Politicians and the public had to grapple with the potential justifications for
providing less safety for the elderly than for others. The public ultimately
rejected any such justifications and in doing so gave the EPA painfully clear
guidance on which model contained the stronger normative assumptions.99
Yet this rosy view of democratic participation in the regulatory process
deserves a second look. First, it is unclear exactly how many people made up the
"public" that rejected senior discounting. The entire fracas may speak more to the
power of interest group politics, and the considerable clout wielded by
organizations like the AARP, than to the presence of widely held opposition to
VSL age adjustment among the American people. Even more importantly,
96. Sunstein, supra note 73, at 244.
97. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
98. Sunstein, supra note 73, at 245.
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discomfort with the EPA's senior discounting in 2003 may have stemmed from
certain features of how it was implemented and what that implied about its goals
rather than from any actual disagreement with the principle that regulatory policy
should be especially solicitous of younger lives.
Specifically, much of the public opposition to senior discounting can likely
be attributed to two concerns, one practical and the other expressive. I will label
the first the "O'Donnell Critique" after Frank O'Donnell, an environmental
advocate with Clean Air Watch. O'Donnell responded to a later controversy,
which arose when the EPA decided to reduce its official VSL estimate by $1
million in the spring of 2008,100 by saying that the EPA's move was "really a
devious way of cooking the books," designed to make "the perceived benefits of
cleaning up the air seem less." 1' The second type of objection is the "Boxer
Critique," named for Senator Barbara Boxer, who once sponsored a bill that
attempted to ban the EPA from ever reducing its VSL figure. When pitching her
proposal, Boxer argued that "EPA may not think that Americans are worth all
that much, but the rest of us believe the value of an American life to our families,
our communities, our workplaces and our nation is no less than it ever has
been." 02
The O'Donnell Critique sees senior discounting as a transparent ploy to roll
back regulatory protections in the service of nefarious corporate interests. Its
quarrel is not with the devaluation of seniors, per se, but rather with the idea that
any person should receive less protection than the already inadequate baseline. It
helps explain why the Public Interest Research Group, a longtime opponent of
deregulation, was particularly interested in fighting the EPA's Clear Skies
analysis.
The Boxer Critique, on the other hand, responds to more metaphysical
concerns. It identifies an expressive harm in "devaluing" the lives of seniors, or
anyone else for that matter. Its objection is less with the differential policy
choices that might result from senior discounting than with the very idea of
saying that certain people are "worth more" than others, and the correspondingly
unsavory implications of ever concluding that anyone is "worth less."' 03
100. For a description of the controversy, see Viscusi, supra note 37, at 113-21.
101. David A. Fahrenthold, Cosmic Markdown: EPA Says Life Is Worth Less, WASH. POST,
July 19, 2008, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2008-07-19/news/368596811 _human-life-
statistical-life-air-pollution.
102. Press Release, Sen. Barbara Boxer, U.S. Sen. Comm. on Env't & Pub. Works (July 11,
2008), http://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Majority.PressReleases
&ContentRecord id=13dl6bd9-802a-23ad-4796-ab5314d6439d&Region id=&Issue id=.
103. This reaction speaks to the tremendous gap between the way the word "value" is used by
economists and by laypersons. See Trudy Ann Cameron, The Value of Statistical Life: [They] Do
Not Think It Means What [We] Think It Means, 28 Ass'N OF ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. NEWSL,
Nov. 2008, at 36.
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The key point is that neither the O'Donnell Critique nor the Boxer Critique
is inherently opposed to the principle that government should prioritize risk
reductions for the young over risk reductions for the old. Those of O'Donnell's
persuasion might be satisfied as long as age adjustments took the form of "youth
premiums" rather than "senior discounts," thereby ensuring that the
modifications led to a greater overall level of regulatory protection.104
Meanwhile, the Boxer acolytes' concerns could be assuaged if agencies focused
on monetizing life-years rather than lives. If the EPA were to conduct a
sensitivity analysis that employed an invariant life-year value for all citizens,
thereby indirectly placing greater value on younger lives, it might not generate
the same revulsion among Boxerites as the 2003 senior discount,10 5 in spite of the
fact that the two analytical techniques would have similar policy consequences.
It would require additional empirical research to establish whether the
O'Donnell and Boxer Critiques, rather than genuine opposition to the idea of
allocating regulatory protection on the basis of age, accounted for the public's
adverse reaction to senior discounting in 2003. At the very least, though, thinking
about the problem in this light shows how it is possible to reconcile the
tremendous enthusiasm for age adjustment expressed in public choice studies
with the fierce opposition to senior discounting expressed by the PIRG and
AARP. The former is an endorsement of prioritizing risk reductions for the
young. The latter may only be an objection to deregulation, and to the expressive
meaning of a particular style of VSL age adjustment. Agencies could satisfy the
preferences expressed in public choice studies without triggering O'Donnell's or
Boxer's criticism simply by adopting the right kind of age adjustments (i.e., by
monetizing life years rather than lives and by employing youth premiums in
place of senior discounts).
We can therefore accept public choice studies as a valid expression of
society's beliefs on how government should allocate lifesaving resources in spite
of the ostensibly contradictory evidence offered by recent history. And as a
result, if we want to make regulatory analysis respond to more than just narrow
conceptions of individual welfare, basing age adjustments on public choice data
rather than on individual WTP studies would be an advisable step to take.
104. An example of how "youth premium" analyses can win support is offered by the
Department of Transportation rule discussed infra Part IV.
105. In fact, agencies have used invariant VSLY analyses before without raising many
objections. See Sunstein, supra note 73, at 252. Life-year analysis is also pervasive in healthcare,
where the quality-adjusted life-year, or "QALY," is a frequently employed metric. See Graham
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IV. How SHOULD WE INCORPORATE PUBLIC CHOICE DATA INTO COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS?
Once we accept the benefits of incorporating public choice studies into
regulatory analysis, we are still left with the question of how to do so. Many
scholars seem to believe that reform is only possible outside the confines of
quantitative policymaking. 06 Similarly, Executive Order 13,563 acknowledges
that extra-welfarist concerns are often "impossible to quantify," and therefore
will usually appear alongside, rather than as part of, traditional cost-benefit
analysis.107 This offers one approach to how public choice studies could be
incorporated into regulatory policy-as a qualitative corollary to cost-benefit
analysis that might lead agencies to favor certain policies because of the relative
youth of their beneficiaries in spite of the fact that their monetized benefits fall
short of their costs.
An interesting example of this approach comes from the Department of
Transportation's (DOT) recent rulemaking on rearview auto safety. 08 Though
DOT found that its stringent proposed standards would cost more than $12
million per prevented fatality, which is well above standard VSL estimates, it
nonetheless decided to proceed, noting that "the quantitative analysis does not
offer a complete accounting." 09 As DOT recognized, "[W]ell over 40 percent of
the victims of backover crashes are very young children (under the age of five),
with nearly their entire life ahead of them.""o Furthermore, the regulation would
"in many cases, reduce a qualitatively distinct risk, which is that of directly
causing the death or injury of one's own child."'" DOT made no attempt to
quantify precisely how much more tragic a child's death-much less one caused
by a parent-was than a regular adult fatality. It simply appealed to these
considerations as qualitative reasons for adopting the regulation in spite of the
fact that the quantitative accounting failed to add up.112
While this represents one path for age adjustment, an alternative approach
would be to integrate public choice directly into CBA. The results of public
choice studies could support either VSL adjustments or the adoption of
106. See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 210-16.
107. Exec. Order 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011).
108. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard, Rearview Mirrors, 75 Fed. Reg. 76,186
(proposed Dec. 7, 2010) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 571 and 585).
109. Id. at 76,238.
110. Id.
Ill . Id.
112. It is interesting to note that this effort failed to inspire the type of popular backlash
witnessed by the EPA's senior discounting in 2003. This likely reflects the fact that the age
adjustments here took the form of "youth premiums" rather than "senior discounts." It may also
result from people's greater willingness to accept differentiation between children and adults than
between adults of different ages. See Williams, supra note 99, at 81-84.
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something resembling a constant value-of-life-year measure." 3 Both of these
techniques could roughly replicate the marginal rate of substitution between
saving individuals of different ages evidenced by public choice studies. Agencies
could routinely present analyses informed by traditional WTP metrics alongside
those conducted with public choice data, using both to gain perspective on the
policy in question.' 14 This approach would resemble similar proposals scholars
and regulators have offered for using child and cancer premiums."s
The choice between these two alternatives-bringing public choice data in at
the front end through direct incorporation into CBA, or in at the back as a means
of supporting policymakers' discretion to override CBA-depends on what we
want cost-benefit analysis to be. On one account, even progressive critics should
seek to "mend, not end" CBA," 6 in which case it might be advantageous to make
public choice studies part of the mending process. This approach has the
advantage of preserving CBA's function as a check on agency discretion that
keeps regulators from openly pursuing pro-regulatory or deregulatory agendas
and promotes consistency across agencies."17 It may also make it easier for
voices advocating for broader policy analysis to avoid being silenced in the
rulemaking process."
On the other hand, perhaps incorporating public choice studies directly into
CBA only perpetuates the fallacy of trying to translate all of our moral concerns
into a single measure of dollars and cents." 9 Perhaps we want greater agency
discretion as a means of openly acknowledging the value judgments inherent in
our regulatory decisions, and exposing these judgments to political, rather than
merely technocratic, scrutiny. 2 0 In that case, it might be better to make public
choice studies one of the many factors policymakers can qualitatively consider
113. Current OMB guidance, by contrast, counsels against VSL age adjustment entirely, and
instructs agencies to use higher VSLY values for senior citizen. See Circular A-4, supra note 12, at
30.
114. See Williams, supra note 99, at 106-17 (discussing the benefits of an "alternate models"
approach).
115. See id. at 106 (child premiums); Valuing Mortality Risk Reductions for Environmental
Policy: A White Paper, NAT'L CTR. FOR ENVTL. ECON. & EPA, 26 (Draft 2010), http://www.sra.org
/sites/default/files/u32/EPAValuing-mortality-risk- 2010.pdf (cancer premiums).
116. RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: How CosT-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 10 (2008).
117. See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 48, at 101.
118. See Douglas A. Kysar, Politics by Other Meanings: A Comment on "Retaking Rationality
Two Years Later," 48 Hous. L. REV. 43, 76 (2011) (arguing that if "cost-benefit analysis is here to
stay[,] ... then proponents of environmental, health, and safety regulation would do well to start
talking the talk as best they can").
I 19. See ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 215 ("[N]o context-independent, global
consequentialist formula for identifying and aggregating costs and benefits is generally valid ....
[F]acts about costs and benefits must be provided in disaggregated form.").
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alongside traditional CBA. Either way, there should be a role for public choice
studies to play in regulatory analysis.
V. CONCLUSION
Public choice studies offer a more reliable window into citizens' preferences
on age adjustment than measures of individual willingness to pay. First, they do a
better job of capturing the differential welfare benefits of mortality risk
reductions for different age groups by eliciting responses under conditions that
induce reflective contemplation and minimize the corrupting influence of age-
based differences in the marginal utility of money. Second, they incorporate
extra-welfarist convictions that are ignored by individual WTP studies.
Public choice research therefore provides a more satisfying guide for VSL
age adjustment than the individual WTP metrics that guide current practice. In
light of this fact, agencies should rethink the role that alternative forms of
evidence, such as public choice studies, play in CBA. Such open-mindedness
could meaningfully reshape quantitative policymaking-especially in
circumstances in which regulators are asked to determine the relative value of
different kinds of benefits-making it more responsive to a broad range of
societal convictions.
This would be a welcome development. It is, after all, important to
remember what is really at stake when we talk about adjusting the VSL for age.
At its base, this is a question about priorities. It turns on whether a community is
willing to allocate more of its resources to save a young life than to save an older
one. In a democratic polity, policymakers should engage with citizens' beliefs on
such a fraught question rather than narrowly search for potential Pareto
improvements. Regulators must accordingly consider what types of data most
accurately reflect societal priorities. As long as public choice data fit the bill
better than their individual WTP counterparts, they should not be ignored when
agencies choose which lives to save.
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